In this episode I discuss the issue of Molinism with Eric Hernandez and Andrew Rappaport on Andrew's show, Striving for Eternity.
For a follow up episode on this issue, you can see more discussion on Molinism with Eric, myself and others by going here.
Enjoy the show!
First off, there is no interlocutor in Rom. 9:19. If you notice - Paul states "You will say..." so he's anticipating what an interlocutor would say (whether he's right in his anticipation or not... who knows). With that being stated it seems that perhaps Paul believes the interlocutor would say that because he'd be taking a predestination stance. I suppose Paul felt it necessary to state it because the predestination stance would be wrong and it was important for him to point out why, with the use of an imaginary pre-destination believing interlocutor's objection.
ReplyDeleteHello Tyler,
ReplyDeleteThis comment is in regard to your discussion with Eric Hernandez concerning why, on Molinism, there are logically possible worlds that are infeasible. In the conversation with Hernandez you state (several times) that you cannot see why some worlds are logically possible but infeasible. The answer comes from God's Middle Knowledge (MK). Given the content of his MK, God knows that some worlds containing libertarian freedom are logically possible (i.e., they contain no contradictions), but are infeasible because the Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom (CCFs) that make up those worlds are false. Thus, it is not possible for God to actualize those worlds. Those worlds are logically possible but infeasible. Let me give you an illustration for the sake of clarity.
Imagine two worlds (both with human persons endowed with libertarian freedom), W1 and W2, that are identical except for the fact that when I go through the cafeteria line in W1 I choose green Jello and in W2 I choose red Jello. Now, by identical I mean that every event, even down to the movement of every subatomic particle, is the same in W1 and W2 up to the time (t) of my decision between green Jello and red Jello. Let's call all of those events prior to time (t) Circumstances (C). Also imagine that God knows via his MK that "If Troy were placed in C, then he would freely choose green Jello." From this hypothetical scenario we can see the reason why W1 is feasible and W2 is infeasible, although both are logically possible. The move from logical possibility to feasibility is grounded in God's MK. He knows that if Troy were placed in C, then he would choose green Jello. So, He cannot actualize a world with libertarian freedom in which I am placed in C and I choose red Jello. The CCF "If Troy were placed in C, he would freely choose red Jello" is false. Thus, W1 is feasible and W2 is infeasible.
I hope that the content above has made the distinction between logical possibility and feasibility a bit more clear, since in order to even discuss Molinism we must understand this distinction. Moreover, I hope that the content above has provided some clarity on why your argument that Molinism entails the denial of omnipotence is unsound. God cannot actualize an infeasible world. That is just as logically impossible as actualizing a world with a married bachelor or a two-horned unicorn. Thus, the third slide of your "Contra Molinism" powerpoint (elsewhere on Tyler's site) has an error. You move too quickly from "w [a world with universal salvation] is logically possible" to "God actualized w." Given the CCFs, (w) may be infeasible and, thus, not able to be actualized.
I wish you the best in your studies, Tyler! God bless you!
Best,
Troy Peiffer