SUPPOSED BIBLICAL SUPPORT FOR MOLINISM
There are a set of supposed “proof texts” of Molinism from statements of mere counterfactuals that the Molinists will often attempt to claim demonstrate, or at least support, a Molinistic view of God’s MK. I think that rarther than supporting Molinism, these texts go to show a glaring example of eisegesis and that historic Protestant and Reformed views of God’s Free Knowledge explain them just as well, without the need for the invention of a third species of knowledge or the advancement of the problematic system shown above. The three major texts are Matthew 11:21-24, 1 Corinthians 2:7-8, and 1 Samuel 23:11-13 where each text expresses some form of a piece of counterfactual knowledge. The strongest example appears to the narrative of David and the men from Keilah in 1 Samuel 23. Without going into a full summary of the passage, here David seeks counsel from the Lord of what would happen if he chooses to go to one city compared to what would happen if he does not. God tells him what would happen and this informs David’s decision. I do not think that a full exegetical response is even necessary here to show the problem with the view that this demonstrates or specially supports Molinism in any particular way. The absolute most that this shows is that God has counterfactual knowledge. Yet this knowledge, as shown above, is not only extant in historic Protestant and Reformed understandings of the Omniscience of God, but if the above arguments hold, is better explained on those views. Like the countless passages used to try and show Libertarian freedom by pointing to substantive free choice (a position affirmed by Compatiblists, Calvinists, and Libertarians alike) so too, these three passages cannot go to specially support Molinism any more than any view which holds to the Omniscience of God.
Even that is the most it could do. In fact, the mere statement of counterfactuals hardly can be used to demonstrate conclusively anything more than the usage of counterfactual language in rhetoric. Not only can we as limited humans have true counterfactual knowledge without MK be attributed to us (I can know that all things being equal, if I never consume any more food or water, that I would not live another 5 years), but the proclamations in Matthew and 1 Corinthians seems to be rhetorical flourishes more so than attempts to make nuanced and theologically robust statements of metaphysically veridical CCFs. I could think of examples where, in exasperation, one might say, “If my dog could speak English they would understand this better than you!” Should we envisage that person as consciously attempting to make veridical statements of what really would happen? Counterfactuals of this sort are a kind of hyperbolic rhetoric used to draw extreme contrast. Attempts to shoehorn Molinism or Middle Knowledge into such statements as found in Matthew and 1 Corinthians seems quite the stretch.
FOR THE MAIN DIRECTORY OF RESOURCES ON MOLINISM, CLICK HERE.
There are a set of supposed “proof texts” of Molinism from statements of mere counterfactuals that the Molinists will often attempt to claim demonstrate, or at least support, a Molinistic view of God’s MK. I think that rarther than supporting Molinism, these texts go to show a glaring example of eisegesis and that historic Protestant and Reformed views of God’s Free Knowledge explain them just as well, without the need for the invention of a third species of knowledge or the advancement of the problematic system shown above. The three major texts are Matthew 11:21-24, 1 Corinthians 2:7-8, and 1 Samuel 23:11-13 where each text expresses some form of a piece of counterfactual knowledge. The strongest example appears to the narrative of David and the men from Keilah in 1 Samuel 23. Without going into a full summary of the passage, here David seeks counsel from the Lord of what would happen if he chooses to go to one city compared to what would happen if he does not. God tells him what would happen and this informs David’s decision. I do not think that a full exegetical response is even necessary here to show the problem with the view that this demonstrates or specially supports Molinism in any particular way. The absolute most that this shows is that God has counterfactual knowledge. Yet this knowledge, as shown above, is not only extant in historic Protestant and Reformed understandings of the Omniscience of God, but if the above arguments hold, is better explained on those views. Like the countless passages used to try and show Libertarian freedom by pointing to substantive free choice (a position affirmed by Compatiblists, Calvinists, and Libertarians alike) so too, these three passages cannot go to specially support Molinism any more than any view which holds to the Omniscience of God.
Even that is the most it could do. In fact, the mere statement of counterfactuals hardly can be used to demonstrate conclusively anything more than the usage of counterfactual language in rhetoric. Not only can we as limited humans have true counterfactual knowledge without MK be attributed to us (I can know that all things being equal, if I never consume any more food or water, that I would not live another 5 years), but the proclamations in Matthew and 1 Corinthians seems to be rhetorical flourishes more so than attempts to make nuanced and theologically robust statements of metaphysically veridical CCFs. I could think of examples where, in exasperation, one might say, “If my dog could speak English they would understand this better than you!” Should we envisage that person as consciously attempting to make veridical statements of what really would happen? Counterfactuals of this sort are a kind of hyperbolic rhetoric used to draw extreme contrast. Attempts to shoehorn Molinism or Middle Knowledge into such statements as found in Matthew and 1 Corinthians seems quite the stretch.
FOR THE MAIN DIRECTORY OF RESOURCES ON MOLINISM, CLICK HERE.
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