PERSONAL AGENCY PRIOR TO PERSONHOOD
This will be more of a development of the above, where given the removal of God’s decree’s as a determinative factor in the truth makers of CCFs, and that the CCF’s would be logically prior to God’s MK, this means that in somewhat the CCFs must be true independently of God from eternity past and thus prior to the actual creation of any persons. This means that CCFs exist not only independent of God, but also of any personal agents with the creaturely freedom to make those decisions. This seems utterly incoherent.
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ADDENDUM
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This section is admittedly SUPER preliminary. I understand the argument (as stated) is not yet valid and so please do not think of the numbering as a strict syllogism. This is more just a kind of directedness argument = an argument in the direction of an argument I'm trying to form. Nevertheless, I think this encapsulates a common objection to LFW, and specifically to the role of personal agency prior to personhood required for the Molinist concept of Middle Knowledge to go through.
It's basically an argument that the presumption of LFW in the metaphysics of Middle Knowledge causes other problems. Basic train of thought though is this kind of reductio ad absurdum:
1. If (G) is an infeasible world because John would never choose X in accordance with X being true in (G), then there is something either exterior or interior to John which determines his choosing ~X.
2. If exterior then LFW is false.
3. If interior, then LFW is possible.
4. If interior to John, it is either determined by something in John, or it is random.
5. The Molinist denies it is random and thus something interior must determine.
6. The conditions of John's nature (genes, environment, experiences, emotions, etc.) are all not freely chosen by John.
7. Therefore all of the conditions that determine John's choices are determined by something outside of John.
8. Christian theology holds that John, individually, is fearfully and wonderfully made by God, as John and not as ~John.
9. God has directly or indirectly (primarily or secondarily) determined the conditions of John's nature which John does not freely choose.
10. This is what we typically call Compatibilism.
11. Molinism therefore affirms Compatibilism in it's defense of LFW.
12. Molinism therefore entails a contradiction.
13. Molinism is therefore false.
FOR THE MAIN DIRECTORY OF RESOURCES ON MOLINISM, CLICK HERE.
This will be more of a development of the above, where given the removal of God’s decree’s as a determinative factor in the truth makers of CCFs, and that the CCF’s would be logically prior to God’s MK, this means that in somewhat the CCFs must be true independently of God from eternity past and thus prior to the actual creation of any persons. This means that CCFs exist not only independent of God, but also of any personal agents with the creaturely freedom to make those decisions. This seems utterly incoherent.
------------
ADDENDUM
------------
This section is admittedly SUPER preliminary. I understand the argument (as stated) is not yet valid and so please do not think of the numbering as a strict syllogism. This is more just a kind of directedness argument = an argument in the direction of an argument I'm trying to form. Nevertheless, I think this encapsulates a common objection to LFW, and specifically to the role of personal agency prior to personhood required for the Molinist concept of Middle Knowledge to go through.
It's basically an argument that the presumption of LFW in the metaphysics of Middle Knowledge causes other problems. Basic train of thought though is this kind of reductio ad absurdum:
1. If (G) is an infeasible world because John would never choose X in accordance with X being true in (G), then there is something either exterior or interior to John which determines his choosing ~X.
2. If exterior then LFW is false.
3. If interior, then LFW is possible.
4. If interior to John, it is either determined by something in John, or it is random.
5. The Molinist denies it is random and thus something interior must determine.
6. The conditions of John's nature (genes, environment, experiences, emotions, etc.) are all not freely chosen by John.
7. Therefore all of the conditions that determine John's choices are determined by something outside of John.
8. Christian theology holds that John, individually, is fearfully and wonderfully made by God, as John and not as ~John.
9. God has directly or indirectly (primarily or secondarily) determined the conditions of John's nature which John does not freely choose.
10. This is what we typically call Compatibilism.
11. Molinism therefore affirms Compatibilism in it's defense of LFW.
12. Molinism therefore entails a contradiction.
13. Molinism is therefore false.
FOR THE MAIN DIRECTORY OF RESOURCES ON MOLINISM, CLICK HERE.
sorry for my english. i have an interesting argument about the existence of god: say that we will see a self replicating robot ( lets say even with dna) on a far planet. do we need to conclude design or a natural process in this case? remember that according to evolution if its made from organic components and have a self replicating system we need to conclude a natural process because it has living traits. but we know that even a self replicating robot is evidence for design. therefore a penguin for instance need design too
ReplyDelete:as for the problems with evolution you may interested in this
https://answersingenesis.org/evolution/
have a nice day