THE ABILITY TO ACT CONTRARY TO GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE
Given the problems raised in #5 and #7 above concerning actualization and determinism, the issue of human freedom to act contrary to God’s foreknowledge arises. If one has true Libertarian freedom, then nothing constrains the decisions that one makes. It cannot be determined by any factor prior to it, and at the time of decision, one could in actual fact choose otherwise. Without going into the numerous nuances of various Libertarian views, and why an overwhelming majority of philosophers and theologians reject them and opt for some version of Compatiblism, I would love to note the incoherence that such a position creates. We can ask the question, can a Libertarian free agent actually choose to act contrary to what God foreknew would happen prior to actualizing that world? That is, could God’s knowledge err?
On Libertarianism, especially under Molinism, the answer seems to be, unavoidably, yes. Before the objections arise, let me clarify two things, a) I am not saying that God’s foreknowledge is causal, b) I am not make a modal claim of necessity. Those two charges come quick and furious when this form of argument is made so I need to state from the outset that those are neither my assumptions, nor my argument. So what is the argument?
If the Molinist wants to deny #7, then the free agent at T1 could choose, on a whim, to do X or not-X. Yet, God would have actualized this world based on a specific set of facts about this world that makes it this world and not another. As we saw above with the buttons, while God’s foreknowledge may not be causally determinate, surely the act of creation is. And yet, the Molinist denies this which means that nothing constrains or determines in any way, primarily or secondarily through means, the freewill actions of persons. This means that God’s Free Knowledge of the actual world would be provisional. At T1, John may choose W, which God foreknew. But he may choose not-W, which God did not foreknow. Even if God is right 100% of the time, it is inexplicable why God is right 100% of the time. This kind of providential grounding problem of Molinism I take it to be a different kind of grounding problem than the ones above dealing with God’s Middle Knowledge and God’s Aseity. Here, this expands the grounding problem even to God’s Free Knowledge.
However, there is a problem even more severe. This kind of ungrounded Free Knowledge becomes nearly indistinguishable from Open Theism. For even if God was right 100% of the time, he could not possible know that he would be right 100% of the time. With each free decision of man, as history unfolds, God would have his Free Knowledge confirmed to him in actual fact. That is, God would learn that his Knowledge of the facts of the free choices in the actual world was in fact true and that at every instance the person chose in line with what God foreknew before actualizing the world and in the moments leading up to the decision. For if it is possible for someone to choose something other than what God foreknew, God could, in principle, never foreknow in which worlds someone would choose other than what God foreknew. So the propositions of God’s knowledge would literally be confirmed to him with each subsequent freewill decision. This, I take it, to be one of the most severe problems of Molinism. If this objection holds, then one of the implications of Molinism just is Open Theism and would render it a heretical system of doctrine.
FOR THE MAIN DIRECTORY OF RESOURCES ON MOLINISM, CLICK HERE.
Given the problems raised in #5 and #7 above concerning actualization and determinism, the issue of human freedom to act contrary to God’s foreknowledge arises. If one has true Libertarian freedom, then nothing constrains the decisions that one makes. It cannot be determined by any factor prior to it, and at the time of decision, one could in actual fact choose otherwise. Without going into the numerous nuances of various Libertarian views, and why an overwhelming majority of philosophers and theologians reject them and opt for some version of Compatiblism, I would love to note the incoherence that such a position creates. We can ask the question, can a Libertarian free agent actually choose to act contrary to what God foreknew would happen prior to actualizing that world? That is, could God’s knowledge err?
On Libertarianism, especially under Molinism, the answer seems to be, unavoidably, yes. Before the objections arise, let me clarify two things, a) I am not saying that God’s foreknowledge is causal, b) I am not make a modal claim of necessity. Those two charges come quick and furious when this form of argument is made so I need to state from the outset that those are neither my assumptions, nor my argument. So what is the argument?
If the Molinist wants to deny #7, then the free agent at T1 could choose, on a whim, to do X or not-X. Yet, God would have actualized this world based on a specific set of facts about this world that makes it this world and not another. As we saw above with the buttons, while God’s foreknowledge may not be causally determinate, surely the act of creation is. And yet, the Molinist denies this which means that nothing constrains or determines in any way, primarily or secondarily through means, the freewill actions of persons. This means that God’s Free Knowledge of the actual world would be provisional. At T1, John may choose W, which God foreknew. But he may choose not-W, which God did not foreknow. Even if God is right 100% of the time, it is inexplicable why God is right 100% of the time. This kind of providential grounding problem of Molinism I take it to be a different kind of grounding problem than the ones above dealing with God’s Middle Knowledge and God’s Aseity. Here, this expands the grounding problem even to God’s Free Knowledge.
However, there is a problem even more severe. This kind of ungrounded Free Knowledge becomes nearly indistinguishable from Open Theism. For even if God was right 100% of the time, he could not possible know that he would be right 100% of the time. With each free decision of man, as history unfolds, God would have his Free Knowledge confirmed to him in actual fact. That is, God would learn that his Knowledge of the facts of the free choices in the actual world was in fact true and that at every instance the person chose in line with what God foreknew before actualizing the world and in the moments leading up to the decision. For if it is possible for someone to choose something other than what God foreknew, God could, in principle, never foreknow in which worlds someone would choose other than what God foreknew. So the propositions of God’s knowledge would literally be confirmed to him with each subsequent freewill decision. This, I take it, to be one of the most severe problems of Molinism. If this objection holds, then one of the implications of Molinism just is Open Theism and would render it a heretical system of doctrine.
FOR THE MAIN DIRECTORY OF RESOURCES ON MOLINISM, CLICK HERE.
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