CAUSATION AND CREATION
Imagine a scenario in which I know with certainty the following three things:
1. That I know that if I push a red button, that it will set a chain of events in motion that will lead to someone in the world freely choosing to commit murder in the next hour (not via compulsion but via their free choice to do so).
2. That if I push the green button, that this will set a chain of events that will prevent anyone from freely choosing murder (not via restraint but via their free choices not to do so). Finally, I know that which button I choose is the only thing that sets either chain of events in motion.
3. I have unalterably chosen to press one of the buttons.
It seems an obvious and principled fact that at the time of my knowledge of 1 and 2, prior to pressing either of the buttons, I have true counter factual knowledge but have not caused anything. My knowledge is causally effete prior and subsequent to pressing either button. However, once I press the button, I am certainly the determining causal factor having pressed the button which will actualize one and only one foreknown outcome.
Another example could be given that is directly drawn from Molinism.
Imagine two almost identical worlds - (W1) and (W2). They are identical in every single way except until at T1, where in (W1) John will freely choose to have some thought (P) (where P's coming in and out of existence in the mind of John has zero impact on any other propositional fact for any time after T1, but in (W2) John simply does not have thought (P). We will call this single variable difference between (W1) and (W2) "@". God, via MK knows the true propositions, "If I actualize (W1) then at T1, John will freely choose to think (P) but (P) will have no impact on anything following T1," and "If I actualize (W2) then at T1, John will not think (P)," as well as, "Besides "@", there is no difference between (W1) and (W2)."
Let us also, for the sake of simplicity, assume that either (W1) or (W2) could be the actual world such that God's final decision of what world to actualize comes down to (W1) or (W2).
So the question is, once God in fact actualizes (W1) or (W2) is he causally determinitive over which side of "@" is actualized. Well surely the answer is yes. The worlds are identical with the one exception of "@" and it is the metaphysical reality of actualizing either (W1) or (W2) that is the sole determining factor in the realization of which side of "@" is actualized since in all other respects at all points in time leading up to T1, (W1) and (W2) are identical.
This then can be extrapolated out to all events in any given world, including the actions of substantively free creatures. The given events X at any Tn for any world (W#) are thus, at least secondarily, determined by God's actualization of that world though they may be providentially brought about by indirect actions within that world. Those facts about that world cannot be altered to support an objection for it is those facts which precisely makes it that world that God actualized and not some other world. Like the problem of feasibility above, the Molinist may not alter the facts of a possible world in order to escape the possibility of that possible world without, in an ad hoc manner, saying that world is not identical with itself, nor is what God knows or even actualizes about that world identical to itself.
FOR THE MAIN DIRECTORY OF RESOURCES ON MOLINISM, CLICK HERE.
Imagine a scenario in which I know with certainty the following three things:
1. That I know that if I push a red button, that it will set a chain of events in motion that will lead to someone in the world freely choosing to commit murder in the next hour (not via compulsion but via their free choice to do so).
2. That if I push the green button, that this will set a chain of events that will prevent anyone from freely choosing murder (not via restraint but via their free choices not to do so). Finally, I know that which button I choose is the only thing that sets either chain of events in motion.
3. I have unalterably chosen to press one of the buttons.
It seems an obvious and principled fact that at the time of my knowledge of 1 and 2, prior to pressing either of the buttons, I have true counter factual knowledge but have not caused anything. My knowledge is causally effete prior and subsequent to pressing either button. However, once I press the button, I am certainly the determining causal factor having pressed the button which will actualize one and only one foreknown outcome.
Another example could be given that is directly drawn from Molinism.
Imagine two almost identical worlds - (W1) and (W2). They are identical in every single way except until at T1, where in (W1) John will freely choose to have some thought (P) (where P's coming in and out of existence in the mind of John has zero impact on any other propositional fact for any time after T1, but in (W2) John simply does not have thought (P). We will call this single variable difference between (W1) and (W2) "@". God, via MK knows the true propositions, "If I actualize (W1) then at T1, John will freely choose to think (P) but (P) will have no impact on anything following T1," and "If I actualize (W2) then at T1, John will not think (P)," as well as, "Besides "@", there is no difference between (W1) and (W2)."
Let us also, for the sake of simplicity, assume that either (W1) or (W2) could be the actual world such that God's final decision of what world to actualize comes down to (W1) or (W2).
So the question is, once God in fact actualizes (W1) or (W2) is he causally determinitive over which side of "@" is actualized. Well surely the answer is yes. The worlds are identical with the one exception of "@" and it is the metaphysical reality of actualizing either (W1) or (W2) that is the sole determining factor in the realization of which side of "@" is actualized since in all other respects at all points in time leading up to T1, (W1) and (W2) are identical.
This then can be extrapolated out to all events in any given world, including the actions of substantively free creatures. The given events X at any Tn for any world (W#) are thus, at least secondarily, determined by God's actualization of that world though they may be providentially brought about by indirect actions within that world. Those facts about that world cannot be altered to support an objection for it is those facts which precisely makes it that world that God actualized and not some other world. Like the problem of feasibility above, the Molinist may not alter the facts of a possible world in order to escape the possibility of that possible world without, in an ad hoc manner, saying that world is not identical with itself, nor is what God knows or even actualizes about that world identical to itself.
FOR THE MAIN DIRECTORY OF RESOURCES ON MOLINISM, CLICK HERE.
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