Incompatibilism, Compatibilism and Begging the Question

In this episode I discuss a common error among Incompatibilists when trying to argue against Compatibilism and why their attempts at both internal and external critques often fail to even get off the ground. 

Enjoy the show! 

For more on Reformed Theology and Freewill, see the collection HERE.

Incompatibilism, Compatibilism and Begging the Question

It is almost ubiquitous in conversations about freedom of the will for people to be, well, confused. And rightfully so. It is a challenging topic and challenges our assumptions and makes us think about our ideas concepts and how we define and understand terms. Many people will hold to what is called an Incompatibilistic position. That is, they will think that some act being determined and some act being free are, in principle, in conflict with each other; that something simply cannot be determined and free in any significant sense. Thus they will take the word “free” and conceptualize it to mean “not determined” or they will take the word “determined” and conceptualize it to mean “not free.” Now this is all fine and well except for when the debate just is about the nature of freewill and what it means to be determined or free. Especially when they come up against those who hold a Compatibilistic concept of freedom that do not think that something being determined is, in principle, contradictory to something being significantly free. In that discussion, the Incompatibilist must not presume their position (on pain of a question begging fallacy) or try and push their conceptualizations through via definitional fiat (on pain of a special pleading fallacy), but rather they must give independent reasons for why their position is the case and the Compatibilist ought to abandon their position and believe the Incompatibilist position to be the correct one. 

Further, when the Incompatibilist wants to try and make a negative case against Compatibilism, they must do so via one of two methods: a valid external critique, or a valid internal critique. For an external critique to be valid, they must be able to again give independent reasons to believe their premises to be true and more probably than the Compatibilistic position. They still cannot engage in question begging fallacies, nor special pleading fallacies. They cannot, for example, say that Compatibilism is false because we know that something being determined means that there isn’t a real categorical ability to choose other than what we choose, and thus it is not free. Why? Well because that just is something that is only true IF the Incompatibilistic position is true. In effect, it is to argue, “If Incompatibilism is true, then categorical ability is needed for freedom, and since categorical ability is needed for freedom then Compatibilism is false, and thus Incompatibilism is true,” But notice how that is simply to argue in a circle where the conclusion is needed to be assumed in order to fuel the premises to the same conclusion that was assumed. They therefore must give independent reasons that do not rely on the presumption of Incompatiblism to be true in order for the external critique to be valid.

Similarly for an internal critique to be valid, the Incompatibilist must use only concepts available to them within the Compatibilist position, and only things that the Compatibilist would affirm. This is because the form of this kind of argumentation (reductio ad absurdum) is to argue that given some view being true, it logically entails within itself logical incoherencies. This case cannot be made if you argue from the view itself plus some other propositions or principles not affirmed or even flat out denied by the view. I will give an example from another theological discussion where this happens as an analogy, and then return to the freewill discussion. 

Commonly in arguments between Reformed/Covenant Theology, the accusation that Covenant theology is “replacement theology” will be levied against that view. The charge is based on the idea that some have of Covenant theology that the church replaces the nation of Israel. For those unfamiliar with Covenant theology, the view does not actually make that case but rather, the idea is that the church is the full blossoming of Israel. Here I will not go into the Biblical case for such a position or defend why I believe it is the biblical view, but it should be simply noted that Covenant theology does not see the church and Israel as two ontologically distinct entities but rather, that the promises of God to Abraham and the nation are all yes and amen in Christ and that in Christ the promises are fulfilled as he is the seed of Abraham to which the promises were made and as such, Gentile who were foreigners to the commonwealth of Israel and strangers of the promise, are now brought near in Christ as fellow citizens and heirs as the holy nation/royal priesthood, (for more, see Galatians 3, Ephesians 2, and 1 Peter 2). They would view the olive tree in Romans 11 as one tree, nourished by the root (which is Christ) to which the individual branches cut off or grafted in just are unbelieving Jews and believing gentiles, respectively – but that there is but one and only one olive tree. It is not that there was one tree and that this has been replaced by a different tree. 

Now, on a Dispensational view there is a hard ontological distinction between Israel and the Church. For the Dispensationalist, the belief is that the promises that were given for Israel and that these are not transferred to the other ecclesia, the other people of God, even though some Dispensationlists think that there is some application of them or benefit of them for the church. Thus, they believe that the nation of Israel still has promises made to them that have yet to be fulfilled (typically the land promises) and as such that these must be fulfilled in Israel and that these are not fulfilled in Christ for the church. 

Now, with these two systems very briefly stated, why is this relevant to the prior discussion about internal/external critiques and the question begging or special pleading fallacies. Well often the charge that Covenant theology is “replacement theology” is levied against it by Dispensationalists. This is because within their system, the nation of Israel and the church just are ontologically distinct peoples of God. So when they hear Covenant theologians say that the Church just is the true Israel, they filter that through their theological commitments, and as such they conceptualize that as a replacement, because on their view for the church to be the true Israel, since they are distinct, it would have to supplant the nation of Israel in the program of God. So they then project that on Covenant theology and call it a “replacement.” However, we can see that if we confine ourself to what Covenant theology views about Israel and the church, it is impossible that this be a replacement in any meaningful sense. We may say that it is a “replacement” in the sense that a teenager “replaces” their childhood self, or an adult “replaces” their teenage self and when they turn 18 get to enjoy the inheritance that was promised to them as a child. But that is not a replacement in the sense that the Dispensationalist means it where one entity usurps the place of another entity. Therefore, the charge of “replacement” becomes an invalid internal critique because it does not rely on the concepts internal to Covenant theology and begs the question of a position that is not only outside of Covenant theology, but one that Covenant theology would actually disagree with, namely, the hard ontological distinction between two peoples of God. And yet this would also fail as an external critique, because it relies on the assumption of the hard ontological distinction without giving independent reason for why it is true and as such merely begs the question of the Dispensationalist understanding to argue toward to the conclusion of the truth of Dispensationalism. 

Here we can see a parody between this failed critique of Covenant theology by Dispensationalists with the kind of critiques offered by Incompatibilists. Often the Incompatibilists will claim that Compatibilism makes God the “author of evil” or that it makes the agent a puppet or a robot. However, this is only the case precisely because they think that if some action is determined then it, in principle cannot be free. As such, they have the presumption of a principled incompatibility between some act being determined and free. But that just is the presumption of Incompatibilism. Thus, the objection that if Compatibilism were true, then someone who was determined would be a robot/puppet or not responsible or that it would make God the author of evil, is to make the following argument:

1. Let us assume for the sake of argument Compatibilism is true. 
2. Incompatibilism is true. 
3. P1 and P2 are contradictory. Therefore,
4. Compatibilism is contradictory. Therefore,
5. Incompatiblism is true. 

Notice here that this is a failed internal critique because in order for the argument to be pushed through, P2 is to bring in an assumption that does not fall within the position of Compatibilism. Thus, it cannot validly show that Compatibilism qua Compatibilism, properly understood, entails a contradiction. This also fails as an external critique however since not only would we not have independent reasons to believe P2, but it also begs the question of the very conclusion that it is trying to support. 

In conclusion, while there are interesting reasons to accept Incompatibilism or to reject Compatiblism, and this article should in no way be read as me claiming that all Incompatibilists are guilting of begging the question or special pleading and thus present failed internal and external critiques, this is a problem that is absolutely pervasive in many attempts by Incompatibilists to attempt to reject Compatibilism or Compatibilistic views like that of Reformed theology and I hope this was helpful as an analysis of the discourse and common arguments that occur in these discussions. 

For more on Reformed Theology, see HERE. 

Tim Stratton and Freewill - A Response to Defenses of the Free Thinking Argument

 

In this episode I respond to an interaction I had with Tim Stratton from Free Thinking Ministries concerning his Free Thinking Argument Against Naturalism and why I think it not only does not work against naturalism, nor Christian Compatibilism, but also why the defenses of it typically fail as well. 

Enjoy the show!

Follow Tim at https://freethinkingministries.com/

For more of my work on Reformed Theology see HERE, and for more on Molinism, see HERE. 

A Warranted Case for Biblical Compatibilism

Libertarian Incompatiblists often say that the Bible demonstrates that their position is the biblical position. I simply disagree, for one very simple reason: Libertarian Incompatiblism and Compatiblism (as well as a handful of other views) all affirm substantive concepts of human choice and moral responsibility associated with those choices. 

Now, the Libertarian Incompatiblist may want to argue that Compatiblism is not successful in reconciling any meaningful concept of of Determinism with any meaningful concept of a Responsibility making Freedom of Choice. But that really does not help them here. Why? Well because Compatibilists disagree with them and think that is it Libertarian Incompatibilism which fails. We will see why this cannot be used in this regard shortly.

Libertarian Incompatiblists will go to some Bible verse that presents a real choice where someone is actually held morally responsible, such as Josh 24:15, "choose this day whom you will serve." They will then say, "SEE! Choice. Freedom. Therefore, the Bible affirms Libertarianism."

The problem is that Compatibilism also affirms substantive choosing and the responsibility that comes with it. We have no problem with such a verse. But then the Libertarian Incompatiblist asserts, "Ah, but your view fails to establish freedom and responsibility, so it cannot account for this verse."

Yet notice what this argument actually is - it begs the question. It says, "Assuming that Compatiblism is false, this verse demonstrates Libertarianism," but the verse is supposed to be being presented as evidence for the case that Libertarian Incompatiblism is true. As such, the Libertarian cannot presuppose the falsity of Compatibilism in their reading of the passage to argue to the conclusion of the falsity of Compatibilism. If we allow this, the Compatibilist can do the same.

The Compatibilist could say, "Assuming that Libertarianism is false, this verse demonstrates Compatibilism," but then we would simply be in a deadlock with both sides simply begging the question of their own positions.

A far more fair analysis is simply that the Bible passages which present choice and decisions are simply metaphysically neutral with regard to the nature of the will in such "choice" passages. What such "choice" passages would prove is simply that some concept of substantive choice and responsibility must be true, that is, that Deterministic Incompatibilism must be false since it denies any substantive concept of choice and human moral responsibility.

Now, this does not mean that Bible cannot adjudicate this issue for us. In fact, the burden of proof for each side, that of Libertarian Incompatibilism and Compatibilism are very lopsided, because the Compatibilist must only show a single example of God determining something while someone is also morally responsible for their choice to be vindicated. In fact, even if no such verse is found, the position is not falsified without a massive appeal to silence. While on the other hand, the Libertarian Incompatibilist must defend a universal negative - that in principle there can be no such instance ever. They need a principled contradiction to exist in every concept of determinism and human choice or moral responsibility in order to be maintained, and a single exception falsifies their view.

So do we see just such examples where God determines an action and the agent makes the choice and/or is morally responsible? We do all over the place in the Bible.

1. Gen 45:5, 7-8: And now do not be distressed or angry with yourselves because you sold me here, for God sent me before you to preserve life... And God sent me before you to preserve for you a remnant on earth, and to keep alive for you many survivors. So it was not you who sent me here, but God.

(Well we know his brothers and the slavers and Potiphar and his wife's choices and the choices of the Pharaoh and his servants and such sent him there, but Joseph says God sent him. So who sent him - God or all those other morally responsible agents? Yes. Notice that Joseph is so emphatic that while we know his brothers sold him and others sent him, he says unequivocally that it was God who determined it.)

2. Gen. 50:20: As for you, you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good, to bring it about that many people should be kept alive, as they are today.

(This is a rephrase of the prior verses, but here the action "it" - selling him into slavery - equally has the intention of his brothers and God behind it. They both intended "it" equally.)

3. Prov. 21:1: The king's heart is a stream of water in the hand of the Lord; he turns it wherever he will.

(Does the King choose his plans and what he wills? Or does God? Yes. Even if we limit this to some special act of providence over monarchs, remember we only need one example of determinism and freedom/responsibility concurring in the same act to falsify Libertarianism.)

4. Jam 4:13-16: Come now, you who say, “Today or tomorrow we will go into such and such a town and spend a year there and trade and make a profit”— yet you do not know what tomorrow will bring. What is your life? For you are a mist that appears for a little time and then vanishes. Instead you ought to say, “If the Lord wills, we will live and do this or that.” As it is, you boast in your arrogance. All such boasting is evil.

(Tomorrow will I choose to go to work, or will God will it? Yes. And apparently it is actually boastful to claim otherwise!)

5. Acts 2:23: this Man, delivered over by the predetermined plan and foreknowledge of God, you nailed to a cross by the hands of godless men and put Him to death.

(Some will claim it makes God the "author of evil" if he predetermines evil actions. But here we are told that the most evil action known to man, the decide of the son of God, was predetermined by God and that godless men put him to death. Does this make God the author of that gravest of all sins? He predetermined it and they chose to do it and are responsible for their sin.)

6. Acts 4:27-28: for truly in this city there were gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, to do whatever Your hand and Your purpose predestined to occur.

(The people and their rulers gathered together against Jesus. Why? To do what the hand of God had predestined them to do. God had predestined it and they chose it and were responsible for it. The former does not, in principle, contradict the latter.)

7. Isa. 14:24: The LORD of hosts has sworn saying, "Surely, just as I have intended so it has happened, and just as I have planned so it will stand."

(Here, Isaiah is refering to the fall of Assyria. How great is the countless mass of human decisions were needed for Assyria to fall? And yet God here says it was exactly what he intended and planned to happen.)

8. Jer 10:23: I know, O LORD, that a man's way is not in himself, Nor is it in a man who walks to direct his steps.

(Here Jeremiah is praising God and saying the ways he is not like the false gods of the nations. And one of those ways is that Jeremiah says that YHWH is more glorious, is that even man does not direct his own steps - that YHWH is the one who does.)

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Now, this was just a small handful of the vast number of verses that one could go to in order to demonstrate that there are cases which falsify the principled objection of the Incompatiblist (that determination and freedom are always, in principle, contradictory). This means that while the "choice" passages maybe be metaphysically neutral on which form of choice is possible, the broader Biblical picture is not.

Here we could also think of a Protestant understanding of Inspiration where God and the human author are both active in determining the exact same text, such that it is equally true to call Romans the word of Paul and the word of God. For more on this, see my article here.

So we can see that not only can the Libertarian Incompatiblist argue from the Scripture for their position exclusively without begging the question of the very conclusion that they are seeking to prove, but also that they cannot meet their burden of a universal negative principle of incompatibility, especially in the face of numerous verses which show instances where determinism and freedom are not in contradiction with each other.

At the very least we can say that the Reformed Christian (or any that affirm some kind of Compatibilism) is warranted in holding their position from the scriptures. Why? Because we can see passages that clearly present humans as making responsible choices, and at the same time we can see passages that clearly present God determining some of those responsible choices. We also can overcome objections to the incompatibility of the two (such as the conflation of of Soft and Hard Determinism, that any kind of determinism makes us robots, or makes love impossible, etc.) Even if the Compatibilist is not able to give a fully systematic reconciliation of these two truths of scripture, absent some kind of defeater for the view, they are warranted to accept them both as true.

Soli Deo Gloria.

Various Calvinist Musings

In this episode I give various Calvinistic musings, ranging from why Inspiration and basic Christian orthodoxy are good arguments for a kind of Calvinistic Compatiblism/Soft Determinism, thoughts on why discussions about sovereignty often fail before they get started, and if Calvinists can "know" that they are elect.

Enjoy the show!

Argument from Inspiration for Compatiblism

According to standard Protestant/Evangelical views on Inspiration (Verbal Plenary Inspiration) God, by the Spirit brought about the exact text and wording such that what the authors of the various scriptural texts wrote could properly be called God's word. However at the same time, we Protestants can rightly say that Paul wrote Romans based on his own beliefs, personality, style, history, autobiography and that inspiration is neither via dictation nor merely of general concepts, nor a kind of sentimental "inspiration" like Shakespeare being inspired by a summer's day.

There is concurrence where God determines the exact wording of the scriptures while the authors are also freely writing what they desired to write.

I think this is a good example of Compatiblism. I can say that the Pentateuch is the direct word of God and that Moses should be praised as a literary genius for his composition of Genesis. Whether we think that this is by supervenience or concurrence or some other thesis, the question can be asked - Was it God who determined the content of his word or the authors? To which it is correctly responded - Both/and, yes.

Many Incompatiblists attempt to make a principled objection that if God causally determines the outcome of some action that the agent is not free in their actions. Inspiration seems to provide a clear exception to the principled objection that shows the assumption of Libertarian forms of Incompatiblism to false.

A Molinist may attempt to say that God merely foreknew what Paul would write and actualized a world where Paul wrote what God would have wanted him to write had he intervened. This poses two problems.

1. Why think such a world is feasible? Maybe the Bible is the best that God could get in a feasible world so it's his Plan B (still a plan but not his perfect word to be sure). And why not Plan C? Or D? or AABB?

2. The Molinist would need to give the metaphysics of how that is a concept of inspiration of the Biblical text specifically and not of any other text, for surely God equally foreknew and actualized the world with War and Peace written in the way that we have it. If the exact metaphysics of the Molinist accounts for the Bible in precisely the same way that it does War and Peace or the Devil's Bible, then in what conceptually significant way can we say that the Bible is inspired in a special way or that it is, properly speaking, "the Word of God"?

To the Incompatiblists reading this, based on the numerous objections to Compatiblism (that it undermines freedom, that it removes the ability to be praise/blameworthy, that if we are determined we cannot said to be rational, etc.) does that fact that God exhaustively determined the Scriptures mean that Paul and the other authors were not free, praiseworthy, rational, etc. in their composition of their texts?

Or to escape this problem, do you then feel the need to alter your view of Inspiration to affirm either a Dictation view or an Aeshetic Inspiration view?