THE UNEVANGELIZED, TRANSWORLD DEPRAVITY AND THE NATURE OF MAN
On strategy common among Molinists is to affirm the hybridization of Plantinga’s hypothetical transworld depravity employed by WLC to answer the supposed problem of the unevagelized. Briefly, the problem of the unevangelized is a specific issue for those who hold to Libertarian views of human freedom as well as the belief that God’s only desire regarding the eternal state of humanity is for universal salvation. That is, that God is a hopeful universalist. This however generates a problem – why would God create a world where so many are apparently damned by accidents of time and geography? That is, why create a world where so many millions of persons lived in times and places in the world completely absent of the message of the gospel of Jesus, if God’s overriding desire is for the salvation of all humanity? Such a world seems wasteful of humanity.
The answer given by WLC and others is that it may be the case (WLC and others are by no means dogmatic about it) that those humans that lived outside of the scope of salvation so to speak, could be those humans that are “transworld depraved,” that is, that there is no possible world in which those persons would ever freely choose God and be saved.
Before answering, I should preface that this view is not universal or necessary to Molinists, however due to his influence, WLC’s argument does seem to have become pervasive in Molinistic thinking and as such, benefit #9 above concerning the problem of the unevangelized is often attributed to Molinism proper. Yet, I would not want those Molinists who know that it is not an inextricable tenet of Molinism to object thinking that I believe this topic to be attributable to all Molinists or even the core propositions of Molinism. However, since it is so popular as already stated, a response ought to be given, of which I have two (besides positive arguments for a more Reformed response).
Firstly, this response to the unevangelized, seems to view human persons as static beings – that “I” could be born anywhere at any time in history. The argument seems to rely on the idea that we humans are like pieces on a board that God could pick up and move whenever and wherever he would like in creation without substantively altering and changing one person into another. I do not understand how this would be possible such that there is even an “I” if I was born at a different time and place. Surely I would be a completely different person, with different genetics, different worldview, and different upbringing and experiences – different in both nature and nurture. My first objection is that I fundamentally have a hard time even conceptualizing the metaphysics of the anthropology on this view.
My second objection is that it also assumes that God was constrained by a specific and certain set of static humans. This position raises the natural question, if it was the case that those static humans wouldn’t believe in any context, why create them at all? Once again, surely there is a logically possible near infinite number of both transworld depraved and transworld righteous humans that God could have created if they can be merely shifted around on the board. In fact, if the objections I presented to the feasibility argument above are sound, then it could be possible for God to create only transworld righteous humans who would believe in any context. Thus we see the breaking through of those objections here – why not simply create [G] and have no problem of the unevagelized to begin with? It seems the failure of the feasibility argument is compounded when taken out of the abstract and examined in a kind of applied scrutiny.
FOR THE MAIN DIRECTORY OF RESOURCES ON MOLINISM, CLICK HERE.
On strategy common among Molinists is to affirm the hybridization of Plantinga’s hypothetical transworld depravity employed by WLC to answer the supposed problem of the unevagelized. Briefly, the problem of the unevangelized is a specific issue for those who hold to Libertarian views of human freedom as well as the belief that God’s only desire regarding the eternal state of humanity is for universal salvation. That is, that God is a hopeful universalist. This however generates a problem – why would God create a world where so many are apparently damned by accidents of time and geography? That is, why create a world where so many millions of persons lived in times and places in the world completely absent of the message of the gospel of Jesus, if God’s overriding desire is for the salvation of all humanity? Such a world seems wasteful of humanity.
The answer given by WLC and others is that it may be the case (WLC and others are by no means dogmatic about it) that those humans that lived outside of the scope of salvation so to speak, could be those humans that are “transworld depraved,” that is, that there is no possible world in which those persons would ever freely choose God and be saved.
Before answering, I should preface that this view is not universal or necessary to Molinists, however due to his influence, WLC’s argument does seem to have become pervasive in Molinistic thinking and as such, benefit #9 above concerning the problem of the unevangelized is often attributed to Molinism proper. Yet, I would not want those Molinists who know that it is not an inextricable tenet of Molinism to object thinking that I believe this topic to be attributable to all Molinists or even the core propositions of Molinism. However, since it is so popular as already stated, a response ought to be given, of which I have two (besides positive arguments for a more Reformed response).
Firstly, this response to the unevangelized, seems to view human persons as static beings – that “I” could be born anywhere at any time in history. The argument seems to rely on the idea that we humans are like pieces on a board that God could pick up and move whenever and wherever he would like in creation without substantively altering and changing one person into another. I do not understand how this would be possible such that there is even an “I” if I was born at a different time and place. Surely I would be a completely different person, with different genetics, different worldview, and different upbringing and experiences – different in both nature and nurture. My first objection is that I fundamentally have a hard time even conceptualizing the metaphysics of the anthropology on this view.
My second objection is that it also assumes that God was constrained by a specific and certain set of static humans. This position raises the natural question, if it was the case that those static humans wouldn’t believe in any context, why create them at all? Once again, surely there is a logically possible near infinite number of both transworld depraved and transworld righteous humans that God could have created if they can be merely shifted around on the board. In fact, if the objections I presented to the feasibility argument above are sound, then it could be possible for God to create only transworld righteous humans who would believe in any context. Thus we see the breaking through of those objections here – why not simply create [G] and have no problem of the unevagelized to begin with? It seems the failure of the feasibility argument is compounded when taken out of the abstract and examined in a kind of applied scrutiny.
FOR THE MAIN DIRECTORY OF RESOURCES ON MOLINISM, CLICK HERE.
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