CALLING FOUL ON FEASIBILITY
In this section I will be arguing that while logical possibility and feasibility are coherent concepts when it comes to issues within creation where we have limited resources, I’m not sure how any coherent concept of feasibility as a limited factor for logical possibility could exist prior to God actualizing any world. If God had not created or instantiated any logically possible world, then it seems that any logically possible world would be feasible for him to create due to no limiting constraints yet even existing prior to God actualizing them, save logic itself. This means that, in principle, the objection would be that there is a set of logically possible worlds that is not logically possible – a pure contradiction. The restrictions of feasibility seem to only constrain options in actually substantiated worlds where already determined features exist to restrain options. I will attempt to show why this is simply not the case with the worlds possible for God to create prior to his decree to create any specific one.
Imagine world (W1) in which all humans (numerically identical or greater than the actual world) freely choose to accept God and be saved (or where Adam never falls nor any of his progeny) such that all humans spend an eternity in blessed fellowship with God. This means that God would also have the true MK (or counterfactual knowledge on Reformed views) that, “If I were to create (W1), then all humanity would spend a blessed eternity with me.”
There is no reason to object that (W1) is not logically possible. So we can ask, why would God not choose to actualize this world? The Molinist often comes back with something like, “Well (W1) may be logically possible but may not be a feasible world because maybe in any world with that many people, not everyone will freely believe.” But notice what they have done. Rather than showing how (W1) is not possible, they have to change the features of (W1) such that not everyone believes. Well that world would not be (W1) but possibly (Wn). They have not shown how that logically possible world, which is logically possible, would not be feasible to actualize without arguing that (W1) would have to be some other world that is not (W1). This would also mean that God could not possibly have the MK of “If I were to create (W1), then all humanity would spend a blessed eternity with me,” but that is precisely what would be present for the world if it was strictly logically possible.
This means that the Molinist would need to explain precisely why, in principle, some certain world of free creatures is unfeasible due to human freedom but others are not when the metaphysics of their existence, the principles of human freedom, logical possibility, and relationship to God’s knowledge are identical. The only difference is quantitative – the number of people saved in one world is higher than the other. Why should this merely quantitative difference make a principled change to the role that human freedom can play in making a logically possible world unfeasible for God to actualize?
I see no reason, given that (W1) is logically possible, and that God is omnipotent and not limited on resources or possibility, that (W1) would not be a feasible world to create. Yet once this is shown, Molinism’s benefit in theology and apologists vanishes and itself becomes infeasible.
In other words, the simple point of this objection is that I see no non-ad hoc reason to accept that anything that is logically possible would not be feasible to God (logically) prior to his decree to actualize any world. It seems obviously true that there could be a “greater world” [G] whereby greater we mean that none are lost to an eternity apart from the love of God and where the number of persons in that world are the same or greater than the [A] (the actual world) does. The rejoinder is that somehow [G] not feasible for God to create because maybe any any possible world with sufficiently free persons, some will freely choose to disobey and reject God. However, this rejoinder suffers numerous fatal problems and is easily defeated.
If God has MK of the free choices in [G] and [A] (actual world) such that God knew before the decree to create, “If I actualize [G], all humans will repent and believe on me and all will be saved.” [G] is logically possible and as such God could actualize [G] just as much as God would know “If I actualize [A], then (n) number of humans will believe on me and be saved.” The metaphysical relationship between the CCFs of [G] and [A] to the MK and free knowledge of God is static. Not only would this shift the goal posts and alter [G] to be a world other than [G] (by not instantiating the CCfs of [G] but swapping them for CCF’s of some world not-[G]) but it ignores that this would make any world unknowable and opaque to God, because CCF’s could differ from the facts of any world known by God’s MK. That is, if God knew via MK “If I actualize [P] then Y will obtain by the free decisions of the persons therein,” and yet an objection to that could be “well it may be possible that for any world with significantly free creatures, may not be feasible for God,” then this means that God could never have true or reliable knowledge of any possible world.
Once this ad hoc rejoinder of feasibility fails, then the question is easily raised: If God desires all to be saved and yet to do so freely, why not actualize [G]? Without the resources of the two wills of God available to the Reformed theologian, the Molinist is now in a position where 8 above is not only not a benefit but now, in fact, a liability of the theory.
Therefore, this use of feasibility seems hopelessly ad hoc. There is no reason to believe that such a world would be logically possible but unfeasible, unless we already presuppose the LFW that the Molinist wants to assume as true. The assertion about why such a world is unfeasible assumes LFW is what prevents the world from being feasible. This is special pleading of the most obvious kind. Why can we not then give a reductio argument such as the following:
In addition to this, it may not be feasible for God to actualize a world whereby his actualization of that world does not in some way determine the decisions of the personal agents in that creation unless he abandons all sovereignty and knowledge of that world before creating it (thus he creates it blind). Then that means no other possible worlds are possible unless they are an entirely random, uncontrolled, and unknown to God world. Since MK means that God has exhaustive true counter factual knowledge of all possible worlds, then God has no knowledge of any feasible world since they would not be possible for him to know any details about since they are not feasible for him to actualize without giving up his sovereignty and foreknowledge. So there would be no fact corresponding to "of God actualized world (X), then P would be true." So God therefore doesn't have MK. So if Molinism is true then it is the case that Molinism cannot be true.
In fact, this one final injurious implication of this ad hoc maneuver to make some logically possible worlds unfeasible for God actually entails that God can have no true knowledge (Middle or Free) of any possible world or, the actual world, and thus we are left with a view of the omnipotence of God that is the same or very similar to that of the Open Theist.
Surely the Molinist would want some justification for the denial of feasibility to worlds that God could know and be sovereign over. There would need to be some argument that there is a logical constraint on God’s creative abilities at that point that does not beg the question or engage in ad hoc special pleading. This would be needed for the Molinist as well to argue that (W1) is logically possible but not feasible without begging the question of LFW, and even why LFW would make (W1) unfeasible but not any other world. For why would LFW make (W1) unfeasible but would not make countless other worlds, even the actual world unfeasible? Couldn’t we just say that it may not be possible in any world with LFW for anyone to freely choose to believe in God?
How does an unfeasible world, prior to God’s decree to create any world, not result in such a world being necessarily impossible – thus logically impossible? So they would argue that it is logically possible, but unfeasible, therefore logically impossible?
We could amend to this the following argument:
1. If God is omnipotent, then God can do all logically possible things.
2. God is omnipotent.
3. God can do all logically possible things. (1, 2)
4. It is logically possible for God to create [G].
5. God can create [G]. (3, 4)
It may be left to any theological system, Molinistic, Reformed, Arminian, SBC “Traditionalism,” or any other to explain why and how God could desire some state of affairs that he does not choose to actualize, but surely the reason cannot be a metaphysical principle in which CCFs in [G] are the same and yet different to themselves and to what God foreknew by any species of knowledge.
I have further developed this argument. You can find this updated and expanded version HERE.
FOR THE MAIN DIRECTORY OF RESOURCES ON MOLINISM, CLICK HERE.
In this section I will be arguing that while logical possibility and feasibility are coherent concepts when it comes to issues within creation where we have limited resources, I’m not sure how any coherent concept of feasibility as a limited factor for logical possibility could exist prior to God actualizing any world. If God had not created or instantiated any logically possible world, then it seems that any logically possible world would be feasible for him to create due to no limiting constraints yet even existing prior to God actualizing them, save logic itself. This means that, in principle, the objection would be that there is a set of logically possible worlds that is not logically possible – a pure contradiction. The restrictions of feasibility seem to only constrain options in actually substantiated worlds where already determined features exist to restrain options. I will attempt to show why this is simply not the case with the worlds possible for God to create prior to his decree to create any specific one.
Imagine world (W1) in which all humans (numerically identical or greater than the actual world) freely choose to accept God and be saved (or where Adam never falls nor any of his progeny) such that all humans spend an eternity in blessed fellowship with God. This means that God would also have the true MK (or counterfactual knowledge on Reformed views) that, “If I were to create (W1), then all humanity would spend a blessed eternity with me.”
There is no reason to object that (W1) is not logically possible. So we can ask, why would God not choose to actualize this world? The Molinist often comes back with something like, “Well (W1) may be logically possible but may not be a feasible world because maybe in any world with that many people, not everyone will freely believe.” But notice what they have done. Rather than showing how (W1) is not possible, they have to change the features of (W1) such that not everyone believes. Well that world would not be (W1) but possibly (Wn). They have not shown how that logically possible world, which is logically possible, would not be feasible to actualize without arguing that (W1) would have to be some other world that is not (W1). This would also mean that God could not possibly have the MK of “If I were to create (W1), then all humanity would spend a blessed eternity with me,” but that is precisely what would be present for the world if it was strictly logically possible.
This means that the Molinist would need to explain precisely why, in principle, some certain world of free creatures is unfeasible due to human freedom but others are not when the metaphysics of their existence, the principles of human freedom, logical possibility, and relationship to God’s knowledge are identical. The only difference is quantitative – the number of people saved in one world is higher than the other. Why should this merely quantitative difference make a principled change to the role that human freedom can play in making a logically possible world unfeasible for God to actualize?
I see no reason, given that (W1) is logically possible, and that God is omnipotent and not limited on resources or possibility, that (W1) would not be a feasible world to create. Yet once this is shown, Molinism’s benefit in theology and apologists vanishes and itself becomes infeasible.
In other words, the simple point of this objection is that I see no non-ad hoc reason to accept that anything that is logically possible would not be feasible to God (logically) prior to his decree to actualize any world. It seems obviously true that there could be a “greater world” [G] whereby greater we mean that none are lost to an eternity apart from the love of God and where the number of persons in that world are the same or greater than the [A] (the actual world) does. The rejoinder is that somehow [G] not feasible for God to create because maybe any any possible world with sufficiently free persons, some will freely choose to disobey and reject God. However, this rejoinder suffers numerous fatal problems and is easily defeated.
If God has MK of the free choices in [G] and [A] (actual world) such that God knew before the decree to create, “If I actualize [G], all humans will repent and believe on me and all will be saved.” [G] is logically possible and as such God could actualize [G] just as much as God would know “If I actualize [A], then (n) number of humans will believe on me and be saved.” The metaphysical relationship between the CCFs of [G] and [A] to the MK and free knowledge of God is static. Not only would this shift the goal posts and alter [G] to be a world other than [G] (by not instantiating the CCfs of [G] but swapping them for CCF’s of some world not-[G]) but it ignores that this would make any world unknowable and opaque to God, because CCF’s could differ from the facts of any world known by God’s MK. That is, if God knew via MK “If I actualize [P] then Y will obtain by the free decisions of the persons therein,” and yet an objection to that could be “well it may be possible that for any world with significantly free creatures, may not be feasible for God,” then this means that God could never have true or reliable knowledge of any possible world.
Once this ad hoc rejoinder of feasibility fails, then the question is easily raised: If God desires all to be saved and yet to do so freely, why not actualize [G]? Without the resources of the two wills of God available to the Reformed theologian, the Molinist is now in a position where 8 above is not only not a benefit but now, in fact, a liability of the theory.
Therefore, this use of feasibility seems hopelessly ad hoc. There is no reason to believe that such a world would be logically possible but unfeasible, unless we already presuppose the LFW that the Molinist wants to assume as true. The assertion about why such a world is unfeasible assumes LFW is what prevents the world from being feasible. This is special pleading of the most obvious kind. Why can we not then give a reductio argument such as the following:
In addition to this, it may not be feasible for God to actualize a world whereby his actualization of that world does not in some way determine the decisions of the personal agents in that creation unless he abandons all sovereignty and knowledge of that world before creating it (thus he creates it blind). Then that means no other possible worlds are possible unless they are an entirely random, uncontrolled, and unknown to God world. Since MK means that God has exhaustive true counter factual knowledge of all possible worlds, then God has no knowledge of any feasible world since they would not be possible for him to know any details about since they are not feasible for him to actualize without giving up his sovereignty and foreknowledge. So there would be no fact corresponding to "of God actualized world (X), then P would be true." So God therefore doesn't have MK. So if Molinism is true then it is the case that Molinism cannot be true.
In fact, this one final injurious implication of this ad hoc maneuver to make some logically possible worlds unfeasible for God actually entails that God can have no true knowledge (Middle or Free) of any possible world or, the actual world, and thus we are left with a view of the omnipotence of God that is the same or very similar to that of the Open Theist.
Surely the Molinist would want some justification for the denial of feasibility to worlds that God could know and be sovereign over. There would need to be some argument that there is a logical constraint on God’s creative abilities at that point that does not beg the question or engage in ad hoc special pleading. This would be needed for the Molinist as well to argue that (W1) is logically possible but not feasible without begging the question of LFW, and even why LFW would make (W1) unfeasible but not any other world. For why would LFW make (W1) unfeasible but would not make countless other worlds, even the actual world unfeasible? Couldn’t we just say that it may not be possible in any world with LFW for anyone to freely choose to believe in God?
How does an unfeasible world, prior to God’s decree to create any world, not result in such a world being necessarily impossible – thus logically impossible? So they would argue that it is logically possible, but unfeasible, therefore logically impossible?
We could amend to this the following argument:
1. If God is omnipotent, then God can do all logically possible things.
2. God is omnipotent.
3. God can do all logically possible things. (1, 2)
4. It is logically possible for God to create [G].
5. God can create [G]. (3, 4)
It may be left to any theological system, Molinistic, Reformed, Arminian, SBC “Traditionalism,” or any other to explain why and how God could desire some state of affairs that he does not choose to actualize, but surely the reason cannot be a metaphysical principle in which CCFs in [G] are the same and yet different to themselves and to what God foreknew by any species of knowledge.
I have further developed this argument. You can find this updated and expanded version HERE.
FOR THE MAIN DIRECTORY OF RESOURCES ON MOLINISM, CLICK HERE.
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